University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Cornhusker Economics

Agricultural Economics Department

4-13-2022

Something Fishy in Seafood Trade?
Kathy Baylis
Lia Nogueira
Linlin Fan
Kathryn Pace

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons, and the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornhusker Economics by
an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

April 13, 2022
agecon.unl.edu/cornhuskereconomics

Cornhusker Economics
Something Fishy in Seafood Trade?
The safety of food imports continues to be in the spotlight. Globally, each year, contaminated food causes
almost 1 in 10 people to fall ill and 420 thousand people to die (WHO, 2017). Protecting consumers from
unsafe foods is complicated by the increased role of
international trade in our food system. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that
disease outbreaks associated with imported food increased from 1996 to 2014, with fish and produce being
the main culprits (Gould et al., 2017). For example, in
2019, two separate cases of tuna from Vietnam were
found to have sickened over 60 people in the United
States (FDA, 2020), and two years before, over 40 people were sickened by an outbreak of histamine poisoning in France caused by tuna imported from Reunion
Island (Velut et al., 2019). Although increased scrutiny
at the border has the laudable goal of protecting health,
food import rejections may be subject to pressure for
import protection. Given that border inspections are
limited, if food inspections are directed to products
that threaten the domestic industry, they may not be
optimally targeting products that threaten domestic
health. In the article titled “Something Fishy in Seafood
Trade? the Relation between Tariff and non-Tariff Barriers” recently published in the American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, we ask whether the application of food import rules has been influenced by demand for protection.
As the use of tariff barriers is restricted by trade agreements, domestic pressure for import protection may
shift to demand for less transparent non-tariff barriers

(NTBs) (Copeland, 1990).1 To limit the protectionist use
of food safety standards as NTBs in agriculture and food
trade, the World Trade Organization (WTO) established
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules to require that any
food import standards must be justified by scientific evidence that proves the barrier is necessary to protect human, animal, or plant health. That said, previous work
demonstrates that SPS standards can act as barriers to
trade. Although flexibility is necessary for creating rules
around SPS standards, this flexibility also leaves room for
protectionist motives to influence the implementation of
NTBs. This article explores the motives behind NTBs,
asking whether NTBs increase as tariff rates fall, and
whether they are more intensively used by countries and
products that have a large domestic demand for protection. We explore these questions by considering the seafood trade with the European Union (EU).
We use detailed information on EU import notifications
and refusals for seafood products from 2005 to 2018 at
the six-digit Harmonized System (HS) code product level
to estimate the effect of a change in tariff rate on the
number of notifications imposed by an importer on a
specific product.2 Notifications occur when a member
state of the EU determines that a product does not meet
EU standards, and the product is either flagged, pulled
from the market, rejected at the border or destroyed. We
then consider the stated reason for the notification and
split mild hazards, such as faulty labeling, from more
severe health concerns, such as salmonella. We also split
the notification data by those products that were finally
allowed entry into the EU and those that were not. We

We define non-tariff barriers to include trade restrictions, such as an import quota, an import ban, or product standard that may or
may not have a protectionist intent but that has the potential to reduce trade flows.
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Import notifications include outright import rejections, recalls and information notices on import food products.
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find that a decrease in tariffs brought about by a trade
agreement is associated with an increase in NTBs as
measured by import notifications. Further, we find this
effect is much larger for those notifications where the
health hazard is small and the products are denied entry
into the EU. In summary, we find that although food notifications are correlated with product and exporter characteristics that reflect risk, they also appear to be influenced by the demand for import protection.
Previous empirical research has found that standards and
the resulting food import rejections or notifications act as
trade barriers especially in the short run and for small,
developing countries. What previous research fails to address is the reason behind these rejections and notifications. This article contributes to the literature by empirically examining the relationship between tariff rates and
NTBs in seafood trade, specifically by asking whether
NTBs are used as a substitute form of protection when
trade agreements drive tariff rates down.
The EU, one of the world’s largest seafood importers,
tracks import notifications through the RASFF system.
Using a count of these notifications by the importer, exporter, product code, and year, we find that as trade
agreements mandate decreases in tariff rates, the number
of notifications increases.
We include explanatory variables related to risk and protectionist characteristics to separate the effects that risk
and demand for protection have on notifications. Importer and exporter country fixed effects are included to control for characteristics not explicitly included in the other
explanatory variables. We find evidence that exporters
that have lower income and received notifications last
year, which one might believe is associated with having a
higher probability of a safety problem, get more notifications than low-risk exporters. Similar results are found
for high-risk products, determined primarily by perishability. Thus, we see evidence that EU import notifications
do target risky products.
More than risk appears to be at play, however. We find
evidence that a reduction in tariff rates is associated with
an increased use of non-tariff barriers. Analysis also
shows that when importers are threatened by relatively
lower-priced goods, they are more likely to issue a notification. These results suggest that the demand for protection plays an important role in the number of notifications issued.
We further test our hypothesis by comparing those notifications of specific low-risk claims against high-risk diseases, such as salmonella, E. coli, and shellfish poisoning,
on the assumption that low-risk notifications may be
more subject to protectionism. We find that of notifications that result in products blocked from entering the

EU, mandated decreases in tariffs are associated more
closely with low-risk notifications. We also run a number
of tests to explore the veracity of our tariff data, our sample, and our functional form assumptions, and find that
our results are robust. Although it is true that SPS standards must have valid and testable backing in science, we
show that NTBs may still be used to suppress competition
in the EU.
WTO requirements are set in place to ensure SPS standards are only used for scientifically backed health and safety protection but do not appear to be working as intended.
The results for this article show that the implementation of
standards may be used directly for protectionist purposes.
Policymakers should take the flexibility in standard implementation into consideration when designing trade rules.
As they stand, rules for the implementation of SPS standards are not strong enough to prevent the intentional use
of NTBs.
We see clear benefits to having NTBs in the form of import standards and notifications. Even if they are directed
purely at unsafe imports, one would expect these barriers
to limit trade, but if they benefit domestic health, then the
benefits could well exceed their cost. Our concern in this
article surrounds the appropriate use of these notifications. We acknowledge that protectionism may not necessarily pose a public health concern. However, with limited
inspection budgets, the consumer welfare gains could conceivably be improved at the margin by taking efforts currently directed to those imports that threaten domestic
production and moving them to target a few more risky
products.
In the case of the EU, allowing individual member states
to interpret and implement standards may be a problem.
All EU members must meet minimum EC standards (set
by the European Commission), but it appears that countries with stronger protectionist motives are using a stricter interpretation and implementation of EC standards to
block imports. Because we observe this effect for different
countries within the EU, it raises the concern that countries outside the EU that have more latitude in setting individual standards might be even more likely to use food
safety regulations as trade barriers.
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